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(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all 
material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an 
informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse. 
Rule 3.3 - COMMENT 
Representations by a Lawyer 
An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for 
litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted 
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on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an 
assertion supporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer 
or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the 
assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of reasonably diligent inquiry. There 
are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative 
misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(c) not to counsel a client to 
commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding 
compliance with Rule 1.2(c), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to 
Rule 8.4(b). 
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need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of 
an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one 
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an 
attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion, 
or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the 
attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon 
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both an appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of a reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
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(a) Request for admission. ...Copies of documents shall be served with the 
request unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made available for inspection 
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under these rules after a verdict is returned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
filed, then any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the court in which the action 
was tried may perform those duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot 
perform those duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he 
may in his discretion grant a new trial. 
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CENTRAL ISSUE 
The central issue in this case is whether Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Steffensen, 
intentionally misled the Court in order to get fees to which he was not entitled from 
the pockets of people who did not owe them. 
Having filed its appellate Answer, (hereafter Answer) Ivie has had the 
opportunity, and duty, to marshall its evidence and to rebut the serious allegations 
stated in Sorensen's Brief on appeal (hereafter Brief). Rule 8(d), URCP. Marshall 
v. Marshall. 915 P.2d 508 (Utah 1996). 
Sorensen submitted that each of the three grounds for fees originally sworn 
to by Mr. Steffensen in his fee affidavit were false, and that his later added grounds, 
aside from the simple fact that they are indeed too late, also do not justify fees. 
Being so challenged, did Ivie support them? This Reply analyzes the Answer and 
submits it failed to do so. 
First, what did Mr. Steffensen say in his affidavit? 
For ease of reference, the pertinent paragraph of that affidavit (Ex. 1) is 
restated in "Affidavit of Costs and Attorney's Fees." 
"5. Plaintiff sued Defendant Cindy Caine under the 
contractor's bond statute. Said statute and the cases that construe 
it require the owner of the real property to honor the agreements 
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between a general contractor and his subcontractors if the owner did 
not obtain a payment bond protecting the subcontractors. The general 
contractor, defendant Neil Sorensen Construction, entered into an 
agreement with plaintiff's predecessor in interest that required the 
general contractor to pay interest at 18% and plaintiff's costs and 
attorney's fees in the event of nonpayment. Under the Utah U.C.C., 
Section 70A-2-201 et. seq., the written bid and then the written 
invoice from plaintiff's predecessor in interest to the general 
contractor in connection with the purchase by the general contractor 
of lighting fixtures form the agreement of the parties, and are fully 
enforceable against the buyer of the goods. The written bid provided 
for the aforementioned interest and attorney's fees. This is the basis 
for plaintiff's claim for interest at 18% and costs and attorney's fees 
from defendant Cain." 
This Court is asked to note that Mr. Stephenson's affidavit did not rely on the 
complaint to justify an award of fees. 
This is a recognition by him that the complaint justifies no fees. That this is 
why he stated three new grounds in his affidavit, is confirmed by the language used 
by the Court in subsequent rulings, which rely wholly on Mr. Steffensen's affidavits 
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as justifying the fees, such as the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order dated December 16, 1992 and signed by Judge Fuchs which provides 
at paragraph 11: 
"Mr. King disputes Plaintiff's counsel's affidavits of attorney fees and 
seeks to take the deposition of counsel on the issue of fees. The 
Court finds Plaintiff's counsel's affidavits, taken as a whole, provide 
all the detail necessary for the Court to determine the reason for fees 
and to form a basis for the Court's awards herein such as there is no 
need to seek additional information and/ or clarification from counsel 
by way of deposition." (App. Brief, Ex 6) (Emphasis added.) 
While in subsequent pleadings, Mr. Steffensen added additional grounds for 
fees from those in his first affidavit for fees, there is only one affidavit by him stating 
his right to fees. This is in his above-quoted affidavit, sworn February 13, 1991, 
(Ex. 1). 
Next, in the complaint at paragraph 6, Sorensen Construction entered into 
an agreement to buy electrical materials for the Caine property. At paragraph 7, the 
complaint (Ex 2) states: 
"7. Main Street provided said material to the defendants for 
which the amount of $947.44 is owing as of April 4, 1989." 
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Thus, the complaint states only an open account claim with no reference to 
any written contract providing for fees. 
For Ivie to rebut Plaintiff's assertion that no such contract providing for fees 
existed, Mr. Steffensen's affidavit stating "the written bid provided for the 
aforementioned interest and attorney fees," all Ivie had to do was submit the written 
bid signed by Sorensen. 
It has not done so. 
In point of fact, there is an unsigned order form for the goods dated April 3, 
1989 (Ex 6). It does have fee language. It is unsigned. There is no evidence 
Sorensen ever saw it. It is not referred to in the complaint in any way. 
If there is a note or contract on which a judgment is based, it is reduced to 
judgment on its face when the judgment is entered. Mr. Steffensen did not offer the 
order to Judge Jones when he applied for the judgment. The apparent reason 
seems to be that if Judge Jones had actually seen it, he would have said something 
like, "Sorry, but an unsigned order doesn't form a contractual basis for fees." 
Similarly, meeting his duty to fully advise Judge Jones, if Mr. Steffensen had 
only added one word to his affidavit, that word being "unsigned," so that his 
language would be, "Sorensen entered into an unsigned written bid that provided 
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for the aforementioned interest and attorney fees..." he would have had the same 
problem and obtained no fee award. 
That the order was unsigned was a material fact. Mr. Steffensen breached 
his professional duty to advise Judge Jones that the order was unsigned. (See 
Rule 3.3 Rules of Professional Conduct, Determinative Statutes, pages vi-viii.) 
Referring to the next ground sworn to by Mr. Steffensen in the affidavit that 
Ivie was entitled to fees pursuant to the Contractors Bond Statute (controverted in 
Sorensen's brief at Point I on the basis that the goods being delivered in April 1989, 
and the complaint being filed in July 1990, the Contractor's Bond Statute was 
unavailable and the claim time barred), this Court could reasonably expect to look 
for an argument by Ivie detailing some later delivery or other circumstance that did 
not make the claim time barred. 
As Mr. Steffensen in the affidavit swore "said statute and the cases 
construing it," this means that Mr. Steffensen told Judge Jones that he was familiar 
with the statute and the cases bearing on it. At page 12 of the Answer, Ivie does 
assert 14-2-2 justified a fee award. That is a bald statement unadorned by fact or 
law. It scarcely meets Ivie's duty to explain to this court why it was entitled to relief 
and fees pursuant to a one year statute on a complaint filed one year and three 
months after delivery. 
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Finally, the third ground for fees, the affidavit says that section 70A-2-201 
et seq. provides a basis for relief and is enforceable against "the buyer of the 
goods" (Sorensen) when coupled with the "written bid." 
This statute defines contract formation. 
Its ten sections simply make no reference to attorney fees. In addition, and 
equally important, it was not plead in the complaint. 
In its Answer, Ivie does not cite 70A-2-201 in any way to justify the award of 
fees, nor explain why Mr. Steffensen included it in his fee affidavit to induce a fee 
award. 
Sorensen submits that being specifically challenged to justify any of the three 
grounds in Mr. Steffensen's fee affidavit, Ivie has met the challenge by silence. 
Ivie's Answer simply talks about other things. 
The Answer's reference to multiple signed contracts providing for fees states 
(Answer page 12): 
"The parties briefed the Sorensen's claim that Ivie was not entitled to 
fees, and that Steffensen committed fraud, at least eight (8) separate 
times. Although the issue has been conclusively and irrevocably 
resolved due to the admissions, Ivie pointed out in its papers filed 
with the Court that there were signed invoices that provided for 
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interest and attorney fees, that under the UCC , even unsigned 
invoices between 'merchants' become the written agreement between 
the parties, and that the contractor's statute required the Sorensens 
to pay the money owed to Main Street-lvie within a certain time 
period, or the Sorensens would be required to pay interest and 
attorney fees The trial judges found that Ivie and Steffensen had 
acted in good faith and reaffirmed that due to the 'deemed admitted' 
admissions, Ivie was conclusively entitled to its judgment" 
(Emphasis added ) 
This suffers from vagueness What portions of these statues or the cases 
construing them support Ivie? Ivie doesn't say 
Where are the "signed invoices that provided for interest and attorney fees" 
for the Came job? Ivie doesn't submit them, but tells this Court they exist 
This becomes serious 
These signed "invoices" are not annexed to the Answer, they are not quoted 
as to content, they are simply submitted as a persuasive statement That is 
because they do not exist (See Determinative Statutes pp u re 78-51-31 Attorney 
Deceit) 
The situation is analogous to In Re Norton. 146 P.2d 899 (Utah, 1994). 
That case was argued in Sorensen's Brief at page 34. 
Now that the Answer is filed, Norton becomes more pertinent because efforts 
of counsel were made at the appellate level there and here. 
Mr. Norton's appeal was rejected, and he was disbarred, because he argued 
as true facts those that were unsupportable. 
Here, Ivie tells this Court there are "signed invoices" for the Caine job, 
knowing they don't exist. 
Determinative Rules and Statutes states: 
(1) 78-51-26 Reference is made to sections (4) that an attorney may never 
seek to mislead a Court and (7) forbidding continuance of an action for any corrupt 
motive. (Determinative Statutes pp. iv) 
(2) 78-51-31. An attorney who practices deceit or collusion with intent to 
deceive a court is liable to disbarment and to forfeit treble damages to the injured 
party in a civil action. (Determinative Statutes, pp. v) 
(3) Rule 3.3 Rules of Professional Conduct and Comment concerning a 
lawyer's duty of candor toward the tribunal. (Determinative Statutes, pp.vi-viii) 
(4) Rule 11 U.R.C.P. (Determinative Statutes, p. viii) 
Are there any documents? What do they say? 
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In its final trial court pleading before Judge Fuchs, dated December 18, 
1995, Exhibit I -2, Ivie submitted four invoices. Sorensen submits them so the Court 
can be informed. 
Exhibit 4 is the actual contract between Main Street and Sorensen for the 
Caine job. This is verified by its content, matching exactly the terms of the 
complaint. It is dated April 4, 1989. It is for $947.44. It is unsigned. It has no 
provisions for fees. 
Exhibit 5 is invoice no. 6214, dated March 10, 1989. It refers to a personal 
order in the name of Russell Sorensen, is signed by Russell Sorensen and does 
provide for fees. This document has absolutely no relationship to Sorensen 
Construction's order and contract for the Caine job. 
It is the sole signed document. 
As the complaint is dated December 1989, and not filed until July 1990, it is 
reasonable to assume Ivie and its counsel had adequate time to review and plead 
all supporting documents, and chose not to allege that Russell's order supported 
the claim against Sorensen Construction, as they do now. 
Exhibit 6, invoice 6252 is dated April 3, 1999, refers to "Lot 10" which 
matches Caine, is not signed and has no dollar figures. It does have a fee 
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provision. This apparently is the "written bid" Mr. Steffensen referred to in his 
affidavit. How it can be a "bid" with no dollar figures is unknown. 
Exhibit 7 does not have an invoice number. It again is billed to Russell 
Sorensen, dated March 23, 1989 and is an order for $65. It is not signed. It has 
no provisions for fees. 
It is patent that none of these four documents creates any right for an award 
of attorney fees, nor 18% interest, on the Caine job. 
Contrast these documents to the order drafted by Mr. Steffensen. 
The final order entered by Judge Fuchs on April 15, 1996 states: 
"3. e. The Plaintiff filed opposing memoranda demonstrating that 
there were not only deemed admitted admissions awarding attorney 
fees, but there were invoices and statutory grounds upon which 
attorney's fees were properly awarded." 
Unfortunately, it is obvious that Judge Fuchs never reviewed those invoices 
or he would not have had that language in his judgment. That he didn't read the 
statutes either seems clear. His failure to examine the documents and read the law 
submitted to him on which his judgments are based are best explained by the 
docket. 
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Judge Fuch's bench ruling on Sorensen's first argument before him is stated 
in the docket as follows: 
"10-5-92 C/O THE COURT WILL NOT RE-VISIT THE ISSUES 
THAT WERE DECIDED BY JUDGE GRANT AND 
JUDGE JONES 
C/0 PARTIES HAVE 7 DAYS TO SEE IF THEY CAN 
STIPULATE TO ANY FINDINGS & CONCLUSION 
REGARDING DEF OBJECTIONS 
IF NOT THE COURT WILL SIGN FINDINGS & 
CONCLUSIONS AS SUBMITTED BY PLA 
COURT WILL CERTIFY THAT THIS IS FINAL 
FOR ORDER AS TO THIS DEF." (Docket Ex. 3, 
p. 8) 
On Sorensen's objection to that order, Judge Fuchs made a second bench 
ruling: 
"1-13-94 Fuchs- BVTT 90 C 1701 Brian Steffensen present on 
behalf of the plat., Sam King present on behalf of the deft. Based 
upon the motion of deft, denies and will not re-visit past orders. C/0 
if Defendant wants to appeal case post bond twice the amount of the 
judgment." (Docket Ex. 3, P. 8) 
The matter brought before Judge Fuchs that he first ruled on, October 5, 
1992, was Sorensen's objection to an order signed by Judge Jones. Judge Jones 
retired before hearing that motion. 
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Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 63(a), U.R.C.P. Judge Fuchs stood in the 
shoes of Judge Jones and had the obligation to determine whether the order was 
appropriate. 
Instead, Judge Fuchs declined to re-visit the issues. That is, he declined to 
read the file, the invoices. He did not assume the burden Judge Jones would of 
had of determining if there was a valid basis for the objection. 
In his second bench ruling, supra, he again declines to re-visit the issues 
and advises Sorensen that they can appeal. 
This refusal to take a look at the actual invoices, and determine whether 
grounds for fees were legitimate or not, is what led Judge Fuchs, in his final order, 
to find there were signed invoices and statutory grounds upon which attorney fees 
were properly awarded. 
When a court enters an order disposing of the case, it has an obligation to 
spell out the facts and law on which that order is based. 
Applied to this case, Judge Fuchs had a duty to specify which statutes were 
appropriate as justifying fees, and which invoices justified fees. 
The reason he failed to do so, and instead to find that there were "signed 
invoices," when the only signed invoice was a totally separate order by Russell 
12 
Sorensen, indicates that he didn't look at the invoices. He accepted counsel's 
statements as to them uncritically. 
Similarly, in Judge Jones rulings, he never states the specific statute nor 
invoice which forms the basis for an award of attorney fees to Ivie against Sorensen 
for the Cain job. He generalized as Judge Fuchs did. 
As cited in Sorensen's Brief on Appeal, Embassy Group v. Hatch. 865 P.2d 
1366 (Utah App. 1993) states findings: 
"...must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts 
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each fact 
and issue is reached." 
No judgment entered in this case by Judge Jones or Judge Fuchs conform 
to the Utah Law concerning adequacy of findings. 
Unfortunately, for an attorney to successfully mislead the Court, it is 
required that the Court not be vigilant in determining if the proposed findings are 
justified by fact and law. When that vigilance is not exercised, consequences such 
as in this case can follow if the attorney preparing the pleadings fails to honor his 
professional commitments. 
On the central issue, what is important is that in his appellate Answer 
Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Steffensen, denies the serious factual allegations 
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concerning his intent to deceive raised in Defendant's brief, but makes no effort to 
cite the documents, state facts, or supply law to support his denial. Accordingly, 
those allegations are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 8(d) U.R.C.P. 
A succinct statement of the consequences facing Mr. Steffensen is in 78-51-
31.U.CA: 
"An attorney and counselor who is guilty of deceit or collusion, 
or who consents thereto, with intent to deceive a court or judge or a 
party to an action or proceeding is liable to be disbarred, and shall 
forfeit to the injured party treble damages to be recovered in a civil 
action." 
In its Answer, Plaintiff does not contend that its original open account 
complaint gave Plaintiff any right to recover attorney fees. 
Plaintiff states no law that a Defendant being held to have admitted 
Demands for Admissions, that such admissions increase the cause of action 
beyond those stated in the complaint, when the only requests made in the demands 
are that the allegations of the complaint be deemed admitted. 
In its Brief, Sorensen cited Utah case law that even on a default, a party is 
entitled to no relief, particularly fees, not justified by the facts and law in his 
complaint. Ivie submits no case to rebut. Leger Construction v. Roberts. 550 P.2d 
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It is apparent that Mi n l iffensen knew that the open account complaint 
asking tor tees buiiiui KJIUIIIIM lu Muluk, nu ««i ill n LUI ILUJ | I - ,IJIII.| III. i I es, 
failed to justify an award of fees. 
How then does he get fen^° 
W' iiiiiii ]ht apf IIIHI h lhii I | HI nil | in HI | i in selves in the shoes of Mr Steffensen 
at the time Judge Jones reversed Judge Grant and held Defendant admitted the 
Demands fur Acfmj3Sions 1D> IjiJiny L 'JL J in L " ; un^u 
We can also assume that Mr. Ueftetiaon wanted the f t t s 1 his is proved 
conclusively by his filing the affidavit for fees stating his three false and unfounded 
( | H I III I I * f HI H l M I ) 
His first step was to insulate Judge Jones from Defendant's objections 
H. sill mulled In |inl inn nl I In I |t II n ms IK I me iJelem iaiiill i nidi ire' iMi/e 
them, so that Defendant could not objud. He did this by mailing it to defense on 
February 13 1991 o Wednesday, and taking them to Judge Jones for entr y I i iday, 
fphrunr/ 1f:> 1T)1 f " thai \i\'hen defense got them on Monday, February 18, the 
judgment was already entered. 
r 
Next he had to persuade Judge Jones. 
Mr. Steffensen obviously knew that a statute or contract must be used to get 
fees (lacking the extraordinary cases such as fraud.) 
We can assume he knew this as he cast his sworn fee affidavit in those 
terms - statutes and written contract. 
Language of the fee affidavit (Ex. 2) is on its face quite persuasive. It 
certainly seems to have persuaded Judge Jones. 
This gives us the whole thing on deceit - the intent, the strategy, the acts and 
the goal attained. It gives us also the necessity of appeal on a petty case. 
DEMANDS FOR ADMISSIONS 
Paragraph 21 of the Complaint (Ex. 2) states that there is a written contract 
which is annexed. 
In point of fact, the contract was not annexed to the copy served on 
Defendants nor the original filed with the clerk of the Court. 
Defense asked Ivie's counsel for the contract. On it being supplied (Ex 4), 
Defendants filed their Answers to the Demands for Admission on October 13, 1989 
(R. 28-30). 
Rule 36(a) provides in part: 
16 
"Copies of documents shall be served with the request unless they 
have been otherwise furnished or made available for inspection." 
IIII in 11 i II III i i Mi I in i t v is • ubniiltfMl I I mi in ill ill 'i i in I iiiii i ii| III mi in ' ill In 1 'mile 
36(a), so Defei i Jai ill had no duty to Answer the [i 111 in i J 
Accordingly, when H If mi I ml lulled it Auu^ei I J Plaintiff s sun in toil > judgment 
motion based on failure to Answer the Demands timely, Defendants took the 
position the answer was timely as the Answers were filed within 30 days of 
fi . H| II |. | I
 (,)|f id 
Defendants dlso based their failure to timely answei JII (he basis that 
counsel unyjndll> u/erlooked thu Uumands ! i > IIIILLJIUM. i us iindijt1 d/vdie if 
them only when he received Plaintiffs summary judgment motion, and that this 
delay was not intentional and caused no prejudice to Plaintiff. 
These HIP I 111 iiiii I | '-itionis. 
The recent Utah opinion Langeland v Monarch. Motors Inc 307 Utah Adv 
h'H| i LJ/ I #hi I- Uldlhs must Hit liiiili de< IUI »i i iledlimj .illllli I i * *i 11 mil h »r 
Admissions. 
On pages 5-6 of Langeland it approved Mi Steffensen's earlier case of 
Brunetti v Mascaru. >•' I I' ]d rr»r> (Utah Pnurt R A| p 1993) find affirmM Judge / 
Palmer's Circuit Court decision in that case denyin j Mi Slnttensen relief for the 
r 
untimely answers. In that case, as here, the Demands for Admission followed the 
complaint and had been overlooked by opposing counsel. 
Also in point, Langeland refers to a footnote in Brunetti stating: 
"This determination (that the merits of the action would be 
undermined unless the admissions were withdrawn) was additionally 
supported by the fact that (the Plaintiff) was unable to prove the truth 
of the requested admissions at trial." 
That footnote is appropriate here as Ivie's request for admissions asks 
Defendants admit the allegations of the complaint were true, including the 
complaint's unsubstantiated request for fees. That is, here, Plaintiff is unable to 
prove his claim that he is entitled to fees. 
It is clear that Plaintiff cannot establish a basis for relief under Brunetti and 
Lanaeland. 
Intermediate rulings of the trial court can be reviewed on appeal. Judge 
Grant's refusal to default Defendants for failure to timely answer the Demands for 
Admissions, reversed by Judge Jones, should be reaffirmed and Judge Jones' and 
Judge Fuchs' orders thereon overruled. Zions First National Bank v. Rockv 
Mountain Irrigation Inc.. 308 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (1-17-1997). 
CONCLUSION 
18 
Plain I1 II II llHc l)fjf*jn qi mi nm opportunity to explain misconduct alleged by 
Defendants In i its Answer, Plaintiff has not done so 
1 '•• i In I i| 11! II, ml , I il I in IIn if i in iinal hnef remains 
appropriate - the Plaintiff defaulted, the Defendant should be awarded full fees and 
costs for all work after February 11\ IIJP1 when Mr Stellei isi 11 lib II II mi i 11 ilii il 
affnlivil ,»HUI n iq fei r- ^ inH ojucii other relief as the court deems proper. 
Dated February / # 1997 
6#^( /&f /£*^ ? 
Samuel King ^ ^ 
Attorney al Law 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAIUNG_ 
I hereby certify that I c«tisectTcrBe~7Tratted-,-a'true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on this / f day of February, 1997, by linttefiLSiates-Mail, 
f^ sfcta357-pQslage_pjB=pakt, to: 
Brian W. Steffensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
675 East 2100 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, UT 8401 
^ 
S Steffensen app 
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Tabl 
BRIAN W. STEFFSNCEN I * 
Attorney at Law r-> JU] 
3760 Hignland Drive, Suite 20 0 
Salt Lake City, Utan 8^106 
Telepnone: (8011 ?~n-^Q*2 
IN THE JblldU CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNJ-
F LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE J F UTAH 
I T I E -jiECTRIC SERVICE, 
* 1 r j • - -
NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION, 
RUSSELL SORENSEN CINDY 
Defendan t , , 
A ^ i a a v i t or Cos t s ana 
j r n e y ' s Fees 
( R e v i s e d ana Updated) 
IH, : No. 9Q3008156 
Juaae Maurice 1, Tone* 
J S . 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ICJJN'I- JJr oxUal AF^ } 
3RIAN *. STEFFENSEN , De_iic 
deposes anc savs: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensee. ^  ^:dc..:e -aw in the 
Stare of Utan, ana am one of m e attorney' s of recorc for lie 
oiaintiff m m e aocve-caotiGnec matter. A,3 sucn I nave actual 
knowledge of facts with respec~ ** 
incurred m tms matter. 
its anc -.eca. :ees 
^c ^ e aaI:e n e r e of f ^ e plaintiff has incurrs 
$15.00 for tne f: 
cnarges• 
ncu reo costs or 
.ing fee and Slfi.^ O -n*»- r e m c r nf Diocess 
I Plaintiff nas also -.ncurreci legal fees in the amount of 
$2783.15- The attorneys in this office have spent slightly less 
than 30 hours^ over the past 20 months at $95*00 per nour in 
initially attempting to nea^j^^_a_sentieinent of~tHis matter .prior-
yO the commencement" of litigation, preparing tne summons anay 
tzamplaint and initial discovery herein, communicating and 
corresponding with the opposition, drafting motion for summary 
judgment, follow up memorandaf correspondence and telepnone calls 
Co ancx from opposing counsel , preparing default documents, 
preparing motion to disqualify and motion to reconsider, oreparing 
reply memoranda, correspondence to counsel and court, arguing 
motions at court, preparing orders and mdgments , r»nr"-psDondinc to 
curl it-
4. 3ased upon my personal knowledge and experience, the sum 
or 32782-15 is a reasonaole attorney's fee for the type and amount 
of services rendered to date, and does nor include fees for future 
services tna* may UH rendered «ii ie process of collecting this 
judgment. 
Plaintiff sued defendant Cindy (la i unJi -he 
contractor's ..bond- statute. Said statute and the cases that 
construe it require the owner of the real property to honor the 
agreements between a general contractor and his subcontractors if, 
the owner did obtain a payment bond protecting the 
subcontracrors. The general .^contractor, defendant Neil Sorenson 
Construction
 f entered into an agreement wirh plaintiff/ s 
predecessor in interest tftar required the general contractor to pay 
^lnterest~^ar^8%~l^ cosrs ana arramey's fees in tne 
evenr of nonpaymenr. Under^the Utah U.C.C., Section JUA-l^TOl et 
sec.
 r the written bid and then the writren invoice from piaintirf; s' 
predecessor in inreresr to the general contractor in connection 
wirh the purcnase by the general conrracror of lighring fixtures 
form the agreement of the parties
 r and is fully enforceable against 
rhe_buyer of the goods. e£^™he written bid provided for _the: 
aforementioned inreresr and attorney's fees. This is tne basis for-
plaintiff's claim for interest at 18% and costs inn attorney7 F fees 
from defendant Cain. 
m DAITiij .a_ ia' ^A r (ffil . 
BRIAN W. STEFrEHSSH 
Brian W. Sterfensen 
s- 17 INSCRIBED MIL SWuRW zo D e f o r e ni u" _ day of 
S/ 
Notary" Puoiic 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I herebv certifv that on the 13* aav of '^^ , 
f°f^/ , * causec a true ana correct copy or tne noregozng 
instmmen" \r he mailed, postage prepaid, addressed as follows* 
Samuel King 
King, Meservy & Dent 
301 Gump & Avers Building 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN 

BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN (#3092) 
Attorney at Law 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah" 84106 
Telephoner (801) 273-3962 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEIL SORENSON CONSTRUCTION, 
RUSSELL SORENSONu and CINDY CAIN, 
Defendants, 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
Judge 
Plaintiff, Ivie Electric Service, by and through its 
undersigned counsel, hereby complains and alleges as follows: 
1. Ivie Electric Service is a Utah corporation with its 
principal place of business in Salt LaJce County, State of Utah, and 
is the assignee of all causes of action that Brent Ivie Electric, 
Inc., a Utah Corporation, ("Ivie") and Main Street Lighting, a Utah 
Corporation, ("Main* Street ") may have against the defendants 
herein^. 
2. Upon information and belief, defendant Neil Sorenson 
Construction (hereinafter, "Sorenson") is a Utah corporation whose 
principal place of business is located in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
3. Defendant Cindy Cain (hereinafter, "Cain") at all times 
relevant hereto was the owner and beneficiary of the property.. 
located at , Utah (the "Cain 
Property"). 
4. Defendant Russell Sorenson is an individual who, upon 
information and belief, is the controlling shareholder of defendant 
"Sorenson", and has operated the same without regard to observing 
the normal corporate formalities and as a mere alter ego of 
himself. As such, defendant Russell Sorenson should be held 
personally liable for the amounts due and owing to plaintiff herein 
from the corporate defendant Sorenson in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice being perpetrated upon the plaintiff herein* 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
FAILURE TO FULFILL CONTRACT 
5- Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 4 above as if set forth in their 
entirety. 
6. Defendant Sorenson entered into an agreement with Main 
Street to provide electrical materials for the Cain property-
7. Main Street provided said materials to the defendants 
for which the amounc of $947.44 is owing as of April 4, 1989. 
8. Defendants have failed to pay the balance due of $947.44. 
9. The principal amount due and owing for materials provided 
by Main Street to defendants is $947.44 together with interest at 
18% per annum from April 4, 1989 until paid in full, court costs, 
and reasonable attorney's fees, 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
QUANTUM MERUIT 
10. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 9 above as if set forth in their 
entirety. 
11. Main Street has provided to defendant Cain materials which 
are the subject matter of this litigation which materials have 
conferred a substantial value upon defendant Cain and her property. 
12. Main Street provided its materials to defendant Cain with 
the expecration of being compensated therefor in an amount equal to 
the reasonable value of the materials. 
13. Main Street has not acted as a volunteer or an 
intermeddler in conducting itself as alleged herein and defendants 
Sorenson and Cain at all times have acknowledged t:hat the actions 
of the Main Street have conferred substantial benefit upon them 
with respect to the materials provided. 
3 
14. To permit defendant Cain to retain the benefits received 
by them from Main Street without compensating Main Street therefor 
would result in the unjust enrichment of the defendant Cain at the 
expense of Main Street, which unjust enrichment should not be 
countenanced by a court of equity. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
FAILURE TO OBTAIN BOND 
15- Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 14 above as if set forth in rheir 
entirety. 
16. On information and belief, defendant Cain is the 
owner of an interest in certain real property situated in Salt Lake 
Counry described above, and entered into a contract with defendant 
Sorenson who was the general contractor, involving over $2000*00 
for the improvement of said property. 
17. Defendant Sorenson entered into an agreement with Main 
Street Lighting, whereby Main Street was to provide certain 
electrical materials to the defendant Cain's Property. This 
agreement provided that defendant Sorenson would pay Main Street 
for the fair and reasonable value of said materials provided, of 
which the amount of $947.44 is still owing, together with interest 
at the rate of 18% per annum on the principal balance due from 
April 4, 19 89, unril paid in full, plus costs and attorney's fees. 
4 
18. Main Street provided materials to the defendant Cain's 
Property for which Main Street has not been paid in full. There is 
presently due and owing the sum of $947.44 for the materials 
provided by plaintiff to the Property, which sum has been due and 
owing since April 4, 1989. 
19. Defendant Cain is individually, severally and personally 
liable to plaintiff for the reasonable value of the materials and 
labor provided to her Property, and stands in the shoes of 
defendant Sorenson with respect to Sorenson's obligations to pay 
Ivie Electric Service the principal, interest, attorney's fees and 
costs of collection due herein. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
FAILURE TO FULFIL CONTRACT 
20. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 19 above as if set forth in their 
entirety. 
21. Defendant Russell Sorenson entered into an agreement to 
purchase electrical supplies from Main Street Lighting. Pursuant 
to this agreement, Main Street Lighting delivered to Russell 
Sorenson certain supplies and billed him therefore. A true and 
correct copy of the invoice for these supplies is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. 
22, Defendant Russell Sorenson has not paid for these items, 
5 
and there remains due and owing to Main Street Lighting the sum of 
$65.86, together with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum 
from March 23, 1989, until paid in full, costs of suit and 
attorney's fees. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1, Pursuant to the First Cause of Action, for Judgment 
against the defendants Neil Sorenson Construction and Russell 
Sorenson, jointly and severally, in the amount of $947.44, together 
with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum from April 4, 
until paid in full, for costs of court incurred in the bringing of 
this action and reasonable attorney's fees. 
2- Pursuant to the Second and Third Causes of Action, for 
judgment against Defendant Cindy Cain in the amount of $947.44, 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum from 
April 4, 1989 until paid in full, for costs incurred in the 
bringing of this action and reasonable attorney's fees. 
3. Pursuant to the Fourth Cause of Action, for a judgment 
against Russell Sorenson in the amount of $65.86, together with 
interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum from March 23, 1989, 
until paid in full, for costs of court and attorney's fees. 
4. For such other relief as the Court deems just under the 
circumstances. 
6 
DATED this day of December, 1989. 
Ss W\ Steffe: 
y for P 
IVI CAIN. CMP 
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Tab 3 
D O C K E T 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC 
Case : 903008156 CV Civil 
Case Title: 
Page 1 
MONDAY MAY 13, 1996 
9:48 AM 
Filing Date: 07/25/90 
Judge: Dennis M. Fuchs 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE VS NEIL SORENSON CONSTRUCTION 
Cause of Action: 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Amount of Suit.: $1000.00 
Return Date....: 
Judgment : SJ Summary Judgment Date: 02/15/91 Amt: $.00 
Disposition....: Date: 
Court Set: HEARING on 01/24/91 at 1000 A in room ? with MDJ 
HEARING on 05/13/91 at 0930 A in room ? with MDJ 
HEARING on 09/27/91 at 093 0 A in room ? with MDJ 
HEARING on 09/23/92 at 0930 A in room ? with DMF 
HEARING on 10/05/92 at 093 0 A in room ? with DMF 
HEARING on 01/13/94 at 0900 A in room ? with DMF 
MOTION HEARING on 07/05/95 at 0900 A in room ? with DMF 
ORAL ARGUMENT on 10/13/95 at 0930 A in room ? with DMF 
HEARING on 02/01/96 at 0930 A in room ? with DMF 
No Tracking Activity. 
No Accounts Payable Activity. 
Transaction: 
Civil File Fee 
Civil File Fee 
Civil File Fee 
Civil File Fee 
Civil File Fee 
Civil File Fee 
Civil File Fee 
Misc Revenue 
Civil File Fee 
Post Cash. Bail 
Party..u PLA Plaintiff 
Name...: 
Date: 
07/26/90 
12/13/90 
02/21/91 
03/08/91 
08/23/91 
12/10/93 
05/24/95 
02/05/96 
05/10/96 
05/10/96 
Cash-in 
.00 
.00 
5.00 
.00 
.00 
5.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
Check-in 
15.00 
30.00 
.00 
5.00 
25.00 
.00 
20.00 
5.00 
190.00 
300.00 
Check-out 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
Total 
15. 00 
30.00 
5.00 
5.00 
25.00 
5.00 
20.00 
5.00 
190.00 
300.00 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE 
0 
D O C K E T Page 2 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC MONDAY MAY 13, 1996 
9:48 AM 
Case : 903008156 CV Civil Filing Date: 07/25/90 
Case Title: Judge: Dennis M. Fuchs 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE VS NEIL SORENSON CONSTRUCTION 
Party..: DEF Defendant 
Name...: 
NEIL SORENSON CONSTRUCTION 
Party..: DEF Defendant 
Name...: 
SORENSON, RUSSELL 
Party..: DEF Defendant 
Name. . . : 
CAIN, CINDY 
Party. . : ATP Atty for Plaintiff 
Name.... : 
STEFFENSEN, BRIAN W 
Party. . r PYR Payor 
Name*^ - r 
SAMUEL KING 
2120 S 1300 E #301 
SLC UT 
I 07/25/90 Case filed on 07/25/90. PAH 
07/26/90 901440153 Civil filing fee received 15.00 PAH 
D O C K E T 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT SLC 
Case : 903008156 CV Civil 
Case Title: 
Page 3 
MONDAY MAY 13, 1996 
9:48 AM 
Filing Date: 07/25/90 
Judge: Dennis M. Fuchs 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE VS NEIL SORENSON CONSTRUCTION 
I 08/20/90 
I 
09/28/90 
I 10/09/90 
10/11/90 
I 10/22/90 
I 
I 
I 
I 
10/24/90 
I 
I 
I 10/31/90 
I 
I 
r 
r 
I 11/14/90 
I 
11/27/90 
r 12/06/90 
r 
i 
i 
12/13/90 
I 12/14/90 
12/31/90 
01/02/91 
01/24/Srl 
01/29/91 
FILED ANSWER OF NEIL SORENSON CONST AND RUSSELL SORENSON 
AND 
FILED: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FILED: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FILED: SUMMONS ON RETRUN-SERVED (CINDY CAIN) 
FIELD: DEFENDANTS ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
FILED: DEFENDANTS DEFENSES TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGE GRANT DENIED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO DEFTS 
NEIL SORENSON CONSTR. AND RUSSELL SORENSON (HE SAID THERE 
APPEARS TO BE A QUESTION OF FACT) (NOTIFIED ALL PARTIES) 
FILED PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S DEFENSES TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CLERK ENTERED DEFAULT CERTIFICATE AS TO DEFT CINDY CAIN ONLY 
FILED: NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
*** FILE GIVEN TO GRANT *** 
FILED:MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SAMUEL KING 
FILED:MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
FILED:VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF POINT & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SAMUEL KING 
FILED DEFT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
FILED REPLY MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SAMUEL KING 
FILED REPLY TO DEFTS REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
FILED REPLY" TO DEFTS REPLY TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SAMUEL KING 
FILED REQUEST FOR HEARING (MOTION TO DISQUALIFY & MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER) 
FILED NOTICE TO SUBMIT (MOTION TO DISQUALIFY £ RECONSIDER) 
FILED THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT (WRONG DOLLAR AMOUNT SENT, CLERK TO 
CALL ATD SAMUEL KING TO REMIT PROPER AMOUNT) 
FILED DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES DEMAND 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND DEMAND FOR- ADMISSIONS 
902400006 Miscellaneous civil fee received 30.00 
FILED DEFT NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION" 
JUDGE GRANT RECUSES HIMSELF FROM CASE. 
CASE REASSIGNED TO JUDGE JONES (JUDGE GRANT UNAVAILABLE) 
JpKES/SC HEARING SET FOR 1/24/91 AT 10 AM ATP/ATD NOTIFIED 
•HRG scheduled, for 1/24/91 at 10:00 A. in room ? with. MDJ 
JONES/SC T189 C1790 T190 C0001 BRIAN STEPHENSEN" PRESENT FOR 
PTLF, SAMUEL KING FOR DEFT^ COURT DENIED PLTF MOTION TO DISQUAL 
ATD KING. COURT ORDERED PLTF MOTION" TO RECONSIDER MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. 
Began tracking Taken Under Advisement Review on 02/24/91 
JONES/SC COURT HAVING TAKEN THIS MATTER UNDER ADVISEMENT, GRANT 
PLTF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ATP/ATD NOTIFIED BY PHONE & 
DOCKET COPY. 
Ended tracking of Taken Under Advisement 
GLD 
WLP 
WLP 
WLP 
WLP 
DGP 
WLP 
WLP 
WLP 
DGP 
DGP 
DGP 
DGP 
DGP 
DGP 
JAR 
JAR 
GLD 
GLD 
GLD 
GLD 
SGC 
GLD 
GLD 
SGC 
GLD 
GLD 
GLD 
GLD 
GLD 
PAH 
PAH 
APJ 
APJ 
PAH 
GLD 
CKN 
CKN-
SGC 
SGCT 
SGC 
SGCT 
SGC 
SGC 
SGC 
SGC 
SGC 
SGC 
SGC 
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC MONDAY MAY 13, 1996 
9:48 AM 
Case : 903008156 CV Civil Filing Date: 07/25/90 
Case Title: Judge: Dennis M. Fuchs 
IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE VS NEIL SORENSON CONSTRUCTION 
I 02/05/91 JONES ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION AND PLD 
I RUSSELL-SORENSEN, $4097^90, $65,86 RUSSELL - - - PLD 
I 02/14/91 FILED AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES PLD 
I 02/15/91 JONES SIGNED ORDER THAT PLTF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SAMUEL KING PLD 
I IS DENIED, AND PLTIF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND TO GRANT PLD 
I SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED PLD 
I JONES SIGNED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION AND PLD 
I RUSSELL SOREMSEN ONLY!!!!!!, $947.44 PRINCIPAL, $323.06 PLD 
I INTEREST, $44.25 COSTS, $2783.15 ATTORNEY'S FEES, PLD 
I $4097.90 TOTAL JUDGMENT PLD 
I A SEPARATE JUDGMENT AGAINST RUSSELL SORENSEN FOR $65.86 PLD 
I PLUS INTEREST. PLD 
I Case judgment is Summary judgment PLD 
02/19/91 JUDGE JONES ENTERED ORDERED PLD 
02/21/91 910350466 Miscellaneous civil fee received 5.00 PAH 
I FILED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER FINDING DEFENDANT'S PLD 
I IN DEFAULT FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF'S PLD 
I "REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS" AND FOR SANCTION AND FEES PLD 
03/06/91 JONES SIGNED DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON CINDY CAIN ONLY!1<!I<, $947.44 PLD 
PRINCIPAL, $44.25 COSTS, $2783.15 ATTORNEY'S FEES, PLD 
$3774.84 TOTAL JUDGMENT PLD 
JUDGE JONES ENTERED DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON CINDY CAIN, $3774.84 PLD 
I FILED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITON TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE PLD 
I ORDER, AND FOR SANCTION AND FEES PLD 
03/08/91 ISSUED EXEC AND FILED PRAECIPE BMC 
910460399 Miscellaneous civil fee received 5.00 BMC 
I 03/14/91 FILED DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR HEARING PLD 
I FILED DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION PLD 
I TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER PLD 
03/18/91 NOTIFIED SAMUEL KING - ATD OF HEARING DATE OF 4-17-91 AT 2:00 PM PLD 
ATD TO NOTIFY PLTF. PLD 
r 03/19/91 FILED NOTICE TO SUBMIT PLD 
r FILED OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR HEARING PLD 
I GOWANS FOR JONES SIGNED ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT PLD 
r AS TO DEFENDANTS NEIL SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION AND RUSSELL PLD 
I SORENSEN PLD 
I GOWANS FOR JONES ENTERED ORDER PLD 
r FILED MOTION OF DEFENDANT'S NEIL SORENSEN" CONSTRUCTION AND PED 
r RUSSELL SORENSEN TO STAY- EXECUTION- OF JUDGMENT PLD 
I 03/20/91 FILED NOTICE OF HEARING - 4-17-91 2:00 P.M. PLD 
0-3/21/91 HRG scheduled for 4/17/91 at 2:00 P in. room ? with. MDJ" PLD 
03/28/91 JONES/PLD OFF RECORD SET FOR HEARING DEFT.'S MOTION TO SET PLD 
ASIDE DEFAULT. PLD 
I 04/02/91 FILED: MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT CAIN TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDG- WLP 
I MENT, FOR LEAVE TO FILE ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, FOR WLP 
I RULE 12(B) (6) URCP RULING AND FOR FEES WLP 
04/11/91 SAMUEL KING PHONED REQUEST CONTINUANCE ON HEARING PLD 
JONES/PLD OFF RECORD C/O HEARING CONTINUED TIL 5-8-91 AT 10:00 PLD 
MAILED NOTICES TO EACH PARTY PLD 
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04/11/91 HRG rescheduled to 5/ 8/91 at 10:00 A in room ? with MDJ PLD 
I- FILED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION FOR- WLP 
I JUDGMENT WLP 
I FILED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSTION TO MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT CAIN TO PLD 
I SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT PLD 
r 04/15/91 FILED COPY OF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSTION TO MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT MKK 
I CAIN TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT. . . MKK 
I FILED COPY OF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSTION TO MOTION TO STAY EXECUT- MKK 
I ION OF JUDGMENT MKK 
I FILED MOTION OF DEFENDANT NEIL SORENSON CONSTRUCTION & OF RUSSEL PLD 
I SORENSON TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR SUMMARY PLD 
I JUDGMENT, FEES AND SANCTIONS AND REQUEST FOR SPECIAL PLD 
I SETTING FOR ORAL ARGUMENT PLD 
I 04/19/91 FILED: DEFT CAIN'S REPLY TO PLTFS MEMO CEJ 
I 04/29/91 FILED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSTION TO DEFENDANT NEIL SORENSON PLD 
I CONSTRUCTION AND OF RUSSELL SORENSON TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT PLD 
I JUDGMENT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FEES AND SANCTIONS AND PLD 
I REQUEST FOR SPECIAL SETTING FOR ORAL ARGUMENT PLD 
05/02/91 JONES/SC HEARING CONTINUED TO 5/13/91 AT 9:30 AM. PLTF & DEFT SGC 
COUNSEL NOTIFIED BY PHONE, NOTICES MAILED. SGC 
HRG rescheduled to 5/13/91 at 9:30 A in room ? with MDJ SGC 
I FILED SORENSON'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSTION PLD 
05/06/91 JONES DENIES MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT PLD 
^OPY OF DOCKET ENTRY SENT TO EACH PARTY) PLD 
05/13/9^ JONES/SC T962 C1450 BRIAN STEFFENSEN PRESENT FOR PLTF, SGC 
SAMUEL KING PRESENT ON DEFT BEHALF. SGC 
COURT ORDERED DEFT MOTION TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. SGC 
Began tracking Taken Under Advisement Review on 06/13/9L SGC 
05/29/91 JONES/SC COURT HAVING TAKEN THIS MATTER UNDER ADVISEMENT FINDS: SGC 
DEFT MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS TO CINDY CAIN SGC 
GRANTED. SGC 
DEFT MOTION TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO SORENSEN SGC 
CONSTRUCTION DENIED. SGC 
COPIES OF DOCKET MAILED TO COUNSEL. SGC 
Ended tracking of Taken Under Advisement SGC 
05/30/91 FILED LETTER FROM SAMUEL KING PLD 
r 06/06/91 FILED NOTICE OF MAILIGN PLD 
I 06/20/91 FILED AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL RE COSTS AND FEES INCURRED SINCE ELTT 
X ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ELD. 
r EILED OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER PREPARED BY DEFENDANTS' ON PLD. 
I CINDY CAIN' S MOTION TQ SET ASIDE DEFAULT ELD 
I 06/21/91 JONES SIGNED ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT" AGAINST CAIN, DENYING PLD 
I MOTION TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DENYING ELD 
I DEFENDANT'S OTHER MOTIONS PLD 
I 07/01/91 FILED REPLY OF CINDY CAIN TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED ORDER & PLD 
I OBJECTION OF DEFENDNATS TO PLAINTFF'S PROPOSED "ORDER PLD 
I SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT AGAINST CAINE, DENYING MOTION TO SET PLD 
X ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S OTHER PLD 
r. MOTIONS" AND MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING PLD 
fa 
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I 07/09/91 FILED REPLY TO "DEFENDANTS SORENSON'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S PLD 
I ATTORNEY FEE REQUEST AND AFFIDAVIT AND PROPOSED JUDGMENT PLD 
I FILED OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER PREPARED BY DEFENDANTS ON THE PLD 
I SORENSON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT ETC. PLD 
I FILED MOTIONFOR PROTECTIWE ORDER PLD 
I 08/07/91 FILED NOTICE OF JUDGMENT PLD 
I 08/13/91 FILED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION, FOR EXTENSION OF PLD 
I TIME IN WHICH TO FILE APPEARL, AND FOR REVIEW OF ALL PLD 
I PROCEEDINGS - SAMUEL KING PLD 
I 08/15/91 FILED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY OF PLD 
I EXECUTION, FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH TO FILE APPEAL, PLD 
I AND FOR REVIEW OF ALL PROCEEDINGS" AND MOTION FOR PLD 
I ATTORNEY'S FEES PLD 
08/22/91 JONES/STGNED ORDER EXTENDING TIME FOR APPEAL PLD 
' JONES ENTERED ORDER EXTENDING TIME FOR APPEAL PLD 
:LED: ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM OF CINDY CAIN MEM 
08/23/9/3^JONES/PLD T-1657 C-617 BRIAN STEFFENSEN PRESENT FOR THE PLAINTIF PLD 
SAMUEL KING PRESENT FOR THE DEFENDANT PLD 
COURT DENIES ANY FURTHER REQUESTS PLD 
911630147 Counterclaim fee received 25.00 MEM 
I FILED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM PLD 
I FILED AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL - RE COSTS AND FEES THROUGHOUT THIS PLD 
I CASE PLD 
09/09/91 FILED REQUEST FOR RECUSAL - SAMUEL KING PLD 
FILED LETTER FROM BRIAN W STEFFENSEN PLD 
FILED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITON TO "DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR STAY,OF PLD 
EXECUTION, FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH TO FILE APPEAL, PLD 
AND FOR REVIEW OF ALL PROCEEDINGS" AND FOR MOTION FOR PLD 
ATTORNEY'S FEES PLD 
FILED NOTICE OF HEARING - 9-19-91 PLD 
FILED STATEMENT OF ISSUES PENDING PLD 
HRG scheduled for 9/19/91 at 9:30 A in room ? with MDJ PLD 
I 09/10/91 FILED MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE - BRIAN W STEFFENSEN PLD 
r FILED PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM OF CINDY CAIN - BRIAN PLD 
I W. STEFFENSEN PLD 
I FILED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' "STATEMENT OF PLD 
I PENDING ISSUES" AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES - BRIAN W. PLD 
r STEFFENSEN" PLD 
r EILED NOTICE OF HEARING - 9-19-91 - BRIAN" W~ STEFFENSEN" ELD 
09/11/91 FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN - SERVED CINDY CAIN" PERSONALLY PLD: 
FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN - SERVED NEIL- SORSENSEN CONSTRUCTION ELD 
FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN - SERVED RUSSELL SORENSEN PLD 
09/19/91 FILED: STIPULATED MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING TO 9/27/91 AT 9:30A. SGC 
MDJ ENTERED ORDER MOTION HEARING CONTINUED TO 9/27/91 AT 9:30 AM SGC 
HRG . rescheduled to 9/27/91 at 9:30 A in room ? with MDJ SGC 
FILED STIPULATION TO CONTINUANCE PLD 
.FILED MOTION TO CONTINUING HEARING PLD 
JONES SIGNED ORDER TO CONTINUING HEARING - 9-27-91 AT 9:30 A..M. PLD 
09/2^/91 JONES/SC T1872 C1187 SAM KING PRESENT ON DEFT BAHALF, PLTF SGC 
^ 
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09/27/91^?EPRESENTED BY BRIAN STEFFENSEN. DEFT COUNSEL ENTERED MOTION. SGC 
CC2126) PLTF- ARGUMENT ENTERED.- (-C27-30)--DEFT COUNSEL. REBUTTLE. SGC 
COURT TO ENTER FINDINGS IN" WRITING. SGC 
COURT FINDS CASE PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED MAY NOT BE CONSOLIDATED SGC 
WITH THIS MATTER. SGC 
I 11/27/91 FILED LETTER FROM BRIAN W STEFFENSEN PLD 
06/30/92 JONES/SC COURT RULES THAT: SGC 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER, THEREFORE WILL NOT BE SET SGC 
ASIDE. SGC 
2 DEFT ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES &. REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS SGC 
WAS LATE & PLTF REFUSSAL TO ACCEPT THEM IS PROPER. SGC 
3 DEFT CLAIM TO RIGHT TO TAKE DEPOSITION REGARDING PLTF SGC 
ATTORNEY FEES IS ERRONEOUS. PLTF ATTORNEY TESTIMONY IS SGC 
SUFFICIENT. SGC 
4 PRIOR RULINGS OF THE COURT WILL NOT BE ALTERED. SGC 
5 REQUEST BY DEFT FOR RECONSIDERATION IS INAPPROPRIATE SGC 
PLTF COUNSEL TO SUBMIT FINDINGS & ORDER FOR SIGNATURE SGC 
PLTF &. DEFT COUNSEL NOTIFIED BY PHONE OF RULINGS. SGC 
07/27/92 CASE REASSIGNED AS PER JUDGE ROTATION - JUDGE FUCHS PLD 
08/03/92 FILED REPLY TO DEFENDANTS OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, TAW 
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER TAW 
I 08/11/92 FILED DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLA'S ANSWER TO DEFT 7/28 OBJECTIONS SWHT 
I TO PLA'S PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS &. ORDER SWH 
I 08/17/92 FILED NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION **FILE WILL GO UP ON 8/27 SWH 
I 08/19/92 FILED MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER MJB, 
I TO DEFENDANT'S JULY 28, 1992 OBJECTION" TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED MJB 
I FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND ORDER MJB 
08/28/92 FILED DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S MJB 
JULY 28, 1992 OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF ;S PROPOSED FINDINGS MJB 
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER MJB 
08/31/92 FILE RETURNED: SET FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ASAP—JUDGE FUCHS SWH 
Notice of Setting SWH 
HRG scheduled for 09/23/92 at 0930 A in room ? with DMF SWH1 
I FILED OBJECTION".TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT SPKL 
I FILED LETTER FROM SAMUEL KING (ATD) £ ORDER. SETTING ASIDE SWHT' 
I JUDGMENT AS TO DEFT CAIN" SWHT 
09/01/92 MAILED NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT TO BOTH PARTIES. SWHI 
I 09/08/92 DMF/ ""ACCORDING TO THE DOCKET, JUDGE JONES" SIGNED ORDER TAW 
I SETTING^ ASIDE DEFAULT AGINST CAMNE1 ONI G'/ZT/'ST- TWILL. TAW 
I NOT SIGN" ANOTHER ONE WITHOUT SOME REASON" OR A. STIPULATION" TAW 
I FROM THE OTHER SIDE" TAW 
09/10/92 ALL PARTIES NOTIFIED WITH: ZL COPY OE THE DOCKET TEXT TAW 
09/15/92 DMFt PER NOTICE TO SUBMIT; "NOTIFY BOTH: ATTY'S THAT ALL ISSUES SWHT 
WILL BE RESOLVED ON" HRG DATE" . *BOTH ATTYS NOTIFIED* SWHT 
I 09/29/92 SENT NOTICES OF ORAL ARGUMENT SWH 
10/02/92 HRG .scheduled for 10/ 2/92 at 9:30 A ia room 2 with. DMF SWH 
HRG rescheduled to 10/ 5/92 at 9:30 A in room ? with. DMF SWH 
E'107/05/92 FU0!S7BM T-1926 C-1018 ATP: BRIAN STEFFENSEN" PRESENT BSM 
I. <STD: SAM KING &. JAY GANTS PRESENT BSM 
O) 
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^ t I 10/05/92 
I-
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
12/16/92 
12/10/93 
12/17/93 
12/21/93 
12/22/93 
12/27/93 
12/28/93 
01/04/94 
QI/13/94. 
r 03/17/94 
r 
I 05/18/95 
05/24/95 
06/20/95 
I 06/29/95 
r 
r 
r 
I 07/03/95 
I 
r 
r 
r 
I.-07/06/95 
rO COURT WILL NOT RE-VIS IT THE ISSUES THAT WERE DECIDED 
BY -JUDGE- GRANT t JUDGE- JONES-
C/O PARTIES HAVE 7 DAYS TO SEE IF THEY CAN STIPULATE TO ANY 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSION REGARDING- DEF OBJECTIONS 
IF NOT THE COURT WILL SIGN FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS AS SUBMITTED 
BY PLA ATTY 
COURT WILL CERTIFY THAT THIS IS FINAL ORDER AS TO THIS DEF 
JUDGE SIGNED FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER 
CALLED ATP TO NOTIFY OF ORDER BEING SIGNED. 
ISSUED WRIT OF EXECUTION AND PRAECIPE 
932350285 Writ fee 5.00 
FILED NOTICE OF JUDGMENT *FIRST AMENDED* 
FILED DEF EX PARTE MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION 
FUCHS/BM ON CALL FROM DEF ATTY SAM KING CASE SET FOR HRG 
HRG scheduled for 12/23/93 at 11:00 A in room ? with DMF 
HRG rescheduled to 12/30/93 at 2:00 P in. room ? with DMF 
HRG rescheduled to 1/13/94 at 9:00 A in room ? with DMF 
FILED NOTICE OF HEARING SCHEDULED ON A SUNDAY CONTACTED ATD THEY 
STATED THEY WILL MAIL A CORRECTED HEARING FOR 1-13-94 AT 9:00 AM 
RECEIVED NOTICE OF RESCHEDULED HEARING FOR 1-3 WHICH IS STILL 
INCORRECT I NOTIFIED ATD OFFICE ONCE AGAIN THAT THEY NEEDED TO 
DO AN AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING SHOWING JAN 13 AS THE COURT DATE. 
FLLED^WCTICE OF RESCHEDULED HEARING ATD MAILED NOTICE TO PLA 
FJBED LETTER AND CASE LAW FROM ATD SAMUEL KING 
FUCHS/BVO T90 C1701 BRIAN STEFFENSEN PRESENT ON BEHALF OF THE 
PLFT, SAM KING PRESENT ON" BEHALF OF THE DEFT BASED UPON THE 
MOTION OF ATTY KING C/O MOTION DENIED AND WILL NOT RE-VISIT 
PAST ORDERS C/O IF DEFT WANTS TO APPEAL CASE HE MAY POST BOND 
TWICE THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT 
FILED CINDY CAINE'S NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DECUS TECUM OF BRENT 
IVTDE 
FILED NOTICE OF JUDGMENT 
ISSUED WRIT OF EXECUTION AND FILED PRAECIPE 
951000090 Writ fee 20.00 
REC MAIL . 
FILED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION-, AND EURTHER RELIEF 
FUCHS" SIGNED ORDER STAYING EXECUTION: UNTIL 07-05-95 
HEARING ON- MOTION" IS SCHEDULED FOR 0T-05-95" AT 9 r 00 
MO scheduled, for: ' 77* 5/95 at SF=aa A. ik room 7 with. DMF 
FILED NOTICE OF HEARING TO PLAINTIFF AND ATTORNEY BRIAN" W 
STEFFENSEN 
FILED DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION" TO ''STAY EXECUTION AND 
FOR OTHER RELIEF" RE: NECESSITY TO REVTSIST 
FILED OBJECTION TO ORDER STAYING EXECUTION AND MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEF'S MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION", AND FOR FURTHER 
RELIEF 
FILED DECLARATION OF BRIAN" W. STEFFENSEN AS TO COSTS AND FEES 
INCURRED AFTER 7/20/92 AND THROUGH 7/5/95 AND NOT YET AWARDED 
FILED MOTION" FOR AWARD OF ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S FEES AND FOR 
BSM 
-BSM 
BSM 
BSME 
BSM" 
BSM: 
BSM 
SWH 
SWH 
VLC 
VLC 
KJR 
KJR 
BSM 
BSM 
BSM 
BSM 
KJR 
KJR 
KJR 
KJR 
KJR 
KJR 
KJR 
BVO 
BVO 
BVO 
BVO 
BVO 
DJO 
DJO 
SN" 
MCS" 
MCS 
MCS 
LCIC 
LOG 
LCIC 
LCK: 
LOC 
LCIC 
LCEC 
LOT 
SN 
SN 
SN 
SN 
SN 
LCIC 
v 
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I 07/06/95 SANCTIONS LCK 
L-07/07/95 FILED- MOTION FOR AWARD OF ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S-FEES AND FOR LCK 
I SANCTIONS ECK 
07/17/95 FUCHS SIGNED ORDER. TO STAY EXECUTION AND FOR OTHER. RELIEF LCK 
I FILED OBJECTION" TO PROPOSED ORDER AND RENEWED REQUEST FOR SNT 
I SANCTIONS AND VERIFICATION SN~ 
I 08/11/95 FILED NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION DCK 
I 08/16/95 FILED DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO DPLAINTIFF'S NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR LMC 
I DECISION LMC 
08/30/95 JUDGE FUCHS ENTERED SET FOR ORAL ARGUMENT DM1 
09/01/95 CLERK SCHEDULED ORAL ARGUMENT HRG FOR 10/13/95 AT 9:30 A DM1 
ARG scheduled for 10/13/95 at 9:30 A in room ? with DMF DM1 
CLERK MAILED NOTICES TO ALL PARTIES DM1 
I FILED LETTER FROM SAM KING PKB 
09/11/95 CLERK SPOKE WITH BOTH PARTIES REGARDING A MEETING IN JUDGE'S DM1 
CHAMBERS BEFORE ORAL ARGUMENT 10/13/95 - BOTH PARTIES AGREED TO DM1 
10/04/95 AT 8:30. DM1 
** FILE SENT TO JUDGE FOR CONFIRMATION ** DM1 
10/12/95 HRG scheduled for 12/ 4/95 at 2:00 P in room ? with DMF DM1 
I 10/13/95 FILED ORDER RE: JUDGE YOUNG'S RULING DENYING WRIT OF MANDAMUS DM1 
I 11/27/95 FILED LETTER FROM BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN TO SAM KING REGARDING DM1 
I THE: UPCOMING HEARING DMI 
11/29/95 HRG" on 12/ 4/95 was cancelled DMI. 
HRG scheduled for 1/ 2/96 at 9:30 A in room ? with DMF DMI 
I 12/29/95 FILED, STIPULATION FOR CONTINUANCE AND ORDER DML 
01/02/96" HRG on 1/ 2/96^  was cancelled. DM31 
•FUCHS/PB T 041 C 445 PKB 
ATP NOT PRESENT PKB 
ATD- SAM KING PRESENT PKB 
C/O MR- KING TO CONTACT MR. STEFFENSEN AND SET UP A. PKB 
_ PHONE CONFERENCE WITH THE JUDGE PKB 
01/04/96" FUCHS/PB OFF TAPE PKB 
PER PHONE CONFERENCE PKB 
C/O CASE RE-SET FOR HEARING PKB 
HRG scheduled- for 2/ 1/96" at 9:30 A in. room. ? with DMF PKB 
01/16/96" FILED DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFF'S ENTITLEMENT TO DMI 
FEES AND INTEREST AND APPROPRIATE RELIEF DMI 
FTftffll EXHIBITS RELATING TO DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM" REr PLAINTIFFS DMI 
ENTITLEMENT TQ FEES AND INTEREST AND APPROPRIATE RELIEF. DMI 
naz/OX/Se^FUCHS/SIi. T248 C2690 SL. 
I BRIAN STEFFENSEN PRESENT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF SL. 
I SAMUEL KING: PRESENT ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS SL. 
I COURT AFFIRMS ALL OF JUDGE JONES PREVIOUS ORDERS & SL 
I UPHOLDS JUDGMENT &. ATTORNEY" FEES AS PRAYED FOR. SL 
I JUDGE FUCHS GRANTS MOTION FOR AWARD OF ADDITIONAL SL 
I ATTORNEYS FEES SL FOR SANCTIONS SL 
I JUDGE FUCHS SIGNED ORDER REGARDING JUDGE YOUNG'S SL 
I RULING DENYING WRIT OF MANDAMUS. SL 
I ATP, BRIAN STEFFENSEN TO PREPARE ORDER. SL 
a 
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02/05/96 Accepted distribution TF $ 5.00 from Misc. Payments screen CN 
-03/0.7/96. CLERK- REC'D PHONE CALL. FROM MIKE AT ATP'S. OFF ICE,-.HE-SAID THAT DM1 
ATD HAS PREPARED AN ORDER ON THE HEARING 2/1/96 IT HAS THE DM1 
WRONG CASE # ON: IT & THE WRONG JUDGE, HE ASKED THAT WE. HOLD DM1 
ON TO IT UNTIL ATP'S OFFICE HAS SUBMITTED THE CORRECT ONE. DMI 
04/15/9S JUDGE FUCHS ENTERED ORDER AFFIRMING PRIOR COURT ORDERS AND DMI 
AWARDING ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PLAINTIFF. DMI 
05/10/96 FILED NOTICE OF APPEAL HSG 
960920475 Notice of appeal fee 190.00 HSG 
960920480 Civil bond posted ========> Check 300.00 HSG 
Posted by: SAMUEL KING HSG 
2120 S 1300 E #301 HSG 
SLC UT HSG 
APPEAL COST BOND HSG 
I FILED UNDERTAKING FOR COSTS ON APPEAL CPN 
05/13/96 SENT CERTIFIED COPY OF NOTICE OF APPEAL AND UNDERTAKING FOR CPN 
COSTS ON APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS CPN 
End of the docket report for this case. 
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LB 
AN ASSOCIATION 
OF INDEPENDENT 
ATTORNEYS 
Court of Appeals 
L-M TA 1997 
*arriyn M. Branch 
:%rk of the Court ATTN: Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Sa„Lake City, UT 84102 % 0 ^ ^ 
RE: Ivie Electric Sen/ice v. Neii Sorensen Construction, Case Mo. 9CQ326-CA -
Supplemental Authority 
Dear Clerk: 
This rule is written pursuant to Rule 24(i), URAP. Chioman v. Miller. 312 Utah Adv. 
Reo. 37 (3/13/97), is submitted as a supplemental authority. Chioman is submitted on two 
points: 
1. A complaint asking for fees but stating no legal basis for them, does not 
justify an award of such fees. Reference to Appellant's Brief at pp. 5, 10, 16, 
19,20,30. 
2. Applicability of 78-27-56 U.C.A. as justifying a fee award when bad faith is 
demonstrated. Appellants Brief pp. 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Samuel' King 
Attorney at Law 
SK/cd 
cc: Brian W. Steffensen 
Attorney for Respondent 
S Sorensen itr 
